Telecommunications: 5G & Network Security

Learn how AnkaSecure enables quantum-resistant cryptography for telecommunications infrastructure, 5G networks, and secure communications.

Telecommunications Security Challenges

Quantum Threat to Telecom

Vulnerable Systems: - 🔴 VPN endpoints: RSA/ECDH key exchange vulnerable to Shor's algorithm - 🔴 SIM card authentication: Classical PKI certificates breakable by quantum - 🔴 5G network slicing: Encrypted traffic capturable today, decryptable later - 🔴 Lawful intercept archives: 10+ year data retention exposes to quantum decryption

Store-Now-Decrypt-Later Risk: - Intelligence agencies capturing encrypted telecom traffic today - Quantum computers decrypt conversations retroactively (national security risk) - Long-lived infrastructure (20+ year deployment cycles)

ETSI Quantum-Safe Cryptography

ETSI TR 103 619 Guidance

Authority: European Telecommunications Standards Institute

Recommendations: - ✅ ML-KEM: NIST-standardized quantum-resistant encryption - ✅ HQC: Algorithm diversity (NIST Round 4 alternate candidate) - ✅ ML-DSA: Quantum-resistant signatures - ✅ Hybrid approach: Combine classical + PQC during transition

AnkaSecure Support: All ETSI-recommended algorithms available

Policy Template: ETSI_QSC_ALIGNED

Use Case: 5G Core Network Security

Scenario

Telecommunications Operator: Global Telecom Inc.

Requirements: - 5G network slicing encryption (isolate tenant traffic) - VPN endpoint protection (quantum-resistant key exchange) - SIM card authentication (post-quantum PKI) - ETSI compliance (TR 103 619)

Implementation

1. 5G Network Slice Encryption

Encrypt traffic between network slices:

// Generate quantum-resistant key for network slice
KeyGenerationRequest sliceKey = KeyGenerationRequest.builder()
    .algorithm("ML-KEM-768")  // ETSI recommended, quantum-resistant
    .keyId("5g-slice-enterprise-A")
    .policy("ETSI_QSC_ALIGNED")  // Telecom-specific policy
    .build();

KeyResponse key = ankaSecureClient.generateKey(sliceKey);

// Encrypt user plane traffic (UP)
EncryptRequest request = EncryptRequest.builder()
    .keyId("5g-slice-enterprise-A")
    .plaintext(base64TrafficData)
    .build();

EncryptResponse encrypted = ankaSecureClient.encrypt(request);

Benefits: - 🔒 Tenant traffic isolation (enterprise slice A cannot see slice B) - 🔒 Quantum-resistant (future-proof against quantum eavesdropping) - 🔒 Algorithm agility (rotate to stronger algorithms as needed)

2. VPN Quantum-Resistant Key Exchange

Replace RSA/ECDH with ML-KEM for VPN endpoints:

// VPN endpoint A generates ML-KEM key pair
KeyGenerationRequest vpnKeyA = KeyGenerationRequest.builder()
    .algorithm("ML-KEM-768")
    .keyId("vpn-endpoint-A")
    .exportable(true)  // Export public key for peer
    .build();

KeyResponse keyA = ankaSecureClient.generateKey(vpnKeyA);

// Export public key for VPN endpoint B
String publicKeyA = keyA.getPublicKey();  // Share with peer

// VPN endpoint B encapsulates session key using A's public key
EncryptRequest kexRequest = EncryptRequest.builder()
    .publicKey(publicKeyA)  // Recipient's public key
    .plaintext(base64SessionKey)  // AES-256 session key
    .build();

EncryptResponse kexResponse = ankaSecureClient.encrypt(kexRequest);

// Send encapsulated key to endpoint A
// Endpoint A decrypts to recover session key

Benefits: - 🔒 Quantum-resistant key exchange - 🔒 Forward secrecy (session keys ephemeral) - 🔒 Drop-in replacement for RSA/ECDH

3. SIM Card Post-Quantum PKI

Issue SIM certificates with ML-DSA signatures:

// Generate SIM signing authority key
KeyGenerationRequest caKey = KeyGenerationRequest.builder()
    .algorithm("ML-DSA-87")  // High security for CA
    .keyId("sim-ca-signing-key")
    .build();

KeyResponse ca = ankaSecureClient.generateKey(caKey);

// Sign SIM certificate (X.509 with ML-DSA signature)
SignRequest certSignRequest = SignRequest.builder()
    .keyId("sim-ca-signing-key")
    .payload(base64X509Certificate)
    .build();

SignResponse signature = ankaSecureClient.sign(certSignRequest);

// Distribute ML-DSA-signed certificate to SIM cards

Benefits: - 🔒 Quantum-resistant SIM authentication - 🔒 Future-proof (SIM cards 5-10 year lifespan) - 🔒 ETSI compliance (TR 103 619)

Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    5G Core Network                           │
│  (UPF, SMF, AMF, PCF - 3GPP network functions)             │
└────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
             │
             │ Network Slice Encryption (ML-KEM-768)
             │
             ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                  AnkaSecure Platform                         │
│  • ML-KEM-768: Network slice encryption                      │
│  • ML-DSA-87: SIM certificate signing                        │
│  • HQC: Algorithm diversity (ETSI backup)                    │
└────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
             │
             ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              HSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3)                        │
│  • Secure key storage for CA keys                            │
│  • Hardware-backed cryptographic operations                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

ETSI Compliance Checklist

ETSI TR 103 619 Recommendations

[x] Quantum-safe encryption: ML-KEM (NIST-standardized)
[x] Algorithm diversity: HQC (NIST backup candidate)
[x] Quantum-safe signatures: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
[x] Hybrid cryptography: Combine classical + PQC during transition
[ ] 5G security: Apply PQC to gNodeB, UPF, SMF communications
[ ] PKI transition: Migrate CA certificates to ML-DSA

Telecommunications-Specific Algorithms

HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic)

Why HQC for Telecom? - ✅ ETSI TR 103 619 recommended (algorithm diversity) - ✅ NIST Round 4 backup candidate (March 2025 standardization) - ✅ Different mathematical foundation than ML-KEM (code-based vs lattice-based) - ✅ High performance (HQC-256: 202 MB/s encryption)

Use Case: Combine ML-KEM + HQC for defense-in-depth

// Primary encryption: ML-KEM-768
// Secondary encryption: HQC-256 (algorithm diversity)
EncryptRequest mlkemRequest = EncryptRequest.builder()
    .keyId("mlkem-primary-key")
    .plaintext(data)
    .build();

EncryptResponse mlkemEncrypted = client.encrypt(mlkemRequest);

// Second layer with HQC
EncryptRequest hqcRequest = EncryptRequest.builder()
    .keyId("hqc-secondary-key")
    .plaintext(mlkemEncrypted.getCiphertext())  // Encrypt the ciphertext
    .build();

EncryptResponse doubleEncrypted = client.encrypt(hqcRequest);
// Adversary must break BOTH ML-KEM and HQC

Lawful Intercept Compliance

Encrypted Traffic Retention

Regulatory Requirement: Telecom operators must retain communications data for law enforcement (varies by jurisdiction: 6 months - 10 years).

Quantum Risk: Encrypted lawful intercept archives vulnerable to quantum decryption.

Solution: Re-encrypt archived intercepts with PQC

#!/bin/bash
# Re-encrypt lawful intercept archives (RSA → ML-KEM)

for archive in /lawful-intercept/*.enc; do
    echo "Re-encrypting $(basename $archive)..."

    # Re-encrypt: RSA-2048 → ML-KEM-1024
    ankasecure-cli crypto reencrypt \
        --input "$archive" \
        --output "${archive}.mlkem" \
        --new-key lawful-intercept-pqc-key

    # Verify re-encryption
    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
        echo "✓ Archive quantum-secured: $(basename $archive)"
    fi
done

Performance Requirements

High-Throughput Scenarios

5G User Plane Throughput: 10-100 Gbps

AnkaSecure Performance: - ML-KEM-768: 82 MB/s = 656 Mbps (single core) - HQC-256: 202 MB/s = 1.6 Gbps (single core) - Parallel processing: 10-20 Gbps (multi-core, 16-core server)

Recommendation: For ultra-high throughput (>10 Gbps), use hardware acceleration (HSM, FPGA) or symmetric encryption (AES-256-GCM: 74 MB/s per core).

Migration Path

Phase 1: VPN & Remote Access (Immediate)

Migrate VPN endpoints to ML-KEM (highest risk, easiest migration)
Replace RSA/ECDH key exchange with ML-KEM-768

Phase 2: 5G Network Functions (2025-2027)

Apply PQC to gNodeB ↔ UPF communications
Quantum-secure network slicing
ML-DSA for control plane authentication

Phase 3: SIM/eSIM PKI (2027-2030)

Issue new SIM cards with ML-DSA-signed certificates
Gradually replace RSA-based SIM PKI

Phase 4: Legacy Systems Decommission (2030-2035)

Retire classical cryptography (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH)
Full PQC deployment (NSA CNSA 2.0 deadline)

ETSI Compliance - TR 103 619 mapping and telecommunications standards
Migration Planning - Organization-wide PQC transition
Algorithm Selection - Choose telecom algorithms

Documentation Version: 3.0.0 Last Updated: 2025-12-26