All Classes and Interfaces

Class
Description
Abstract class for oneOf,anyOf schemas defined in OpenAPI spec
Abstract class for oneOf,anyOf schemas defined in OpenAPI spec
A passkey registration made with the options of createPasskeyRegistrationOptions
 
A stored passkey, with the first recovery codes when it is your first strong factor
 
Capability properties of an authenticator; a property is true only when it is established
 
A new recovery code set, shown once; every earlier code is refused from now on
 
One of the person's authenticators.
 
The authenticator kind
 
The signed-in person's authenticators
 
A started TOTP enrolment, shown once
 
The first code of your authenticator app, which completes the TOTP enrolment
 
Whether the TOTP enrolment was completed, with the first recovery codes when issued
 
The new name of one of your passkeys
 
The tenants the signed-in person may switch to with a refresh_token grant carrying tenant_id
 
WebAuthn RegistrationResponseJSON members
 
Per-action capability flag computed server-side.
 
Activate a READY Exchange (creates the Capability Grant atomically)
Cryptographic capability for the new Grant.
 
 
Cryptographic Actor embedded summary
 
The page of the tenant's cryptographic actor listing (directory().listActors).
Cryptographic Actor — the operational identity that authenticates and executes cryptographic operations on behalf of its parent Application.
Operational classification
 
 
Lifecycle state; only ACTIVE permits authentication
 
Component of a composite hybrid key.
 
Algorithm family of the component, derived from the component algorithm.
 
Component role within the composite key.
 
Public key material and full operational metadata for a tenant-scoped cryptographic key.
How a composite key's components are combined — the construction axis that a coarse key type deliberately does not carry.
 
 
How the key entered the platform (GENERATED or IMPORTED).
 
Key structure: SIMPLE (single-algorithm key) or COMPOSITE (hybrid classical + PQC key).
 
Documentation of the set of fields accepted on a key-metadata merge-patch request.
 
Operational metadata for a tenant-scoped cryptographic key.
Composite-key mode.
 
 
Shape of the key (SIMPLE or COMPOSITE).
 
How the key entered the platform (GENERATED or IMPORTED).
 
The status the key held immediately before being suspended.
 
Current lifecycle state.
 
Detected algorithm and purpose for a single keystore alias (no key material).
 
Purpose derived from the certificate's X.509 KeyUsage: ENCRYPT_DECRYPT, SIGN_VERIFY, or AMBIGUOUS (KeyUsage absent or spanning both families).
 
Factory / entry point for the AnkaSecure© Key Management SDK.
Callback for asynchronous API call.
Callback for asynchronous API call.
ApiClient class.
ApiClient class.
ApiException class.
ApiException class.
 
 
API response returned by API call.
API response returned by API call.
The page of an application listing (directory().listApplications).
An application registered under a tenant: identity, lifecycle, business identity, ownership, risk classification and metadata, as stored.
 
Sensitivity of the data the application handles.
 
Environment classification.
 
Kind of principal; always `APPLICATION` on this record.
 
Operational risk level.
 
Lifecycle status of the application: `ACTIVE`, `SUSPENDED` (temporarily not admitted to cryptographic operations) or `DISABLED`.
 
Cryptographic Asset REFERENCE.
 
An authenticated Key Management SDK instance: one administrative workload's DPoP-bound session in its tenant.
 
 
An alternative that would admit
 
The kind of the path. passkey-enrolment is taken with passkey-registration-options and passkey-registration; totp-enrolment with totp-enrolment and totp-enrolment-verification, after a password the person proved or chose; federated with the action federated and this path's idp_id, in the browser.
 
An answer of the authorization challenge endpoint: the authorization code (200), the next step of the sign-in (403 insufficient_authorization), or the move of the sign-in to the browser for a federated path (403 redirect_to_web).
 
403 only. insufficient_authorization: the sign-in continues with another step. redirect_to_web: the sign-in continues in the browser, through the identity provider of the federated path taken; navigate the browser (top level) to GET /api/v3/auth/idp/initiate?
 
403 only.
 
A tenant the person may enter
 
An authenticator app being enrolled
 
OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata (RFC 8414 §2).
 
Gets or Sets dpopSigningAlgValuesSupported
 
 
Holder for a JWT bearer token represented as char[] rather than String, with a redacted BearerToken.toString() so accidental log statements do not leak the token verbatim.
Response containing blacklisted token JTIs
 
Rotation admissibility verdict for a single candidate target algorithm.
 
The filters and page of a capability grant listing (capabilityGrants().list).
The tenant's explicit capability grants: which actor may use which key for which operation, under which constraints.
Five-dimensional authorization: Actor × Capabilities × Asset(s) × ExchangeContext × ConstraintPolicy. capabilities is a JSONB array (e.g
 
 
One activation capability and whether it may be chosen.
The capability
 
 
Request to change the password of the account named by the access token.
 
Clone an existing Exchange into DRAFT.
 
What a conferral would do and whether it may happen. refusal is the problem document the corresponding write would return, with the same type URI, and is null when the conferral is admitted.
 
 
 
 
Constraint Policy embedded summary
 
The page of a constraint policy listing (constraintPolicies().list).
The tenant's constraint policies: the usage, time and payload bounds a capability grant can carry.
Usage restrictions attached to Capability Grants. rateLimitPerMinute=0 means fully blocked (emergency freeze); null means no rate limit.
 
Exchange Context embedded summary
 
 
Counterparty type catalog entry as seen by the caller.
 
Catalog scope.
 
CreateCapabilityGrantRequest
 
CreateConstraintPolicyRequest
 
CreateExchangeContextRequest
 
Flow direction.
 
Data classification of the exchanged payload
 
Provision an internal crypto use case (Application self-use) as an authorization overlay over keys that ALREADY EXIST.
 
Actor Credential embedded summary. clientSecret is plaintext on 201 only.
 
 
 
 
Which compliance packs the maximum was read from.
 
Key class a maximum cryptoperiod is chosen by, decided on the key's primary material: SYMMETRIC when kty is oct; otherwise ASYMMETRIC_SIGNING when keyOps contain sign; PUBLIC_VERIFICATION when they contain only verify; otherwise ASYMMETRIC_KEY_ESTABLISHMENT.
 
Destruction requests for keys and key versions.
Read-only lookups of the tenant's applications, cryptographic actors and counterparty types: what a key management automation needs to name the grantees and counterparties of the resources it manages.
What activating, resuming or inspecting this Exchange would confer.
 
The Exchange's current lifecycle status
 
Which operation this preview is about
 
The page of the tenant's exchange context listing (exchangeContexts().list).
The tenant's exchange contexts: the bounded settings in which an application's actors exchange protected data with a counterparty.
Governed interaction scenario between a tenant Application and a counterparty.
 
Gets or Sets direction
 
Gets or Sets sensitivity
 
Gets or Sets status
 
 
Create a Cryptographic Exchange in DRAFT status
 
Full Cryptographic Exchange detail
 
Lifecycle status
 
Why the Exchange reached its terminal state.
 
List-page projection of a Cryptographic Exchange
 
Lifecycle status
 
Why the Exchange reached its terminal state.
 
The filters and page of an exchange listing (exchanges().list).
Whether the Exchange's actor holds the operation scopes its grant needs.
 
The tenant's cryptographic exchanges: drafts, validation, activation and the lifecycle of an active exchange.
PATCH-style update for DRAFT or READY Exchange.
 
An entry that failed validation or import.
 
Entry type.
 
Failure category: - CERTIFICATE_VALIDATION_FAILED: the certificate failed validation (STRICT mode), an expired or otherwise unacceptable certificate included - KEY_BINDING_FAILED: the entry's private key does not match its certificate - KEY_ID_RETIRED: the entry's Key ID belonged to a destroyed key of this tenant; a Key ID is never reused, so the entry needs another Key ID - UNEXPECTED_ERROR: an internal processing error; errorMessage carries a fixed text
 
Request for a password-reset link.
 
Acknowledgement of a password-reset request.
 
The detected keystore format (informational only).
 
Keystore format detected from the keystore's leading bytes. - PKCS12: detected from the 0x30 leading byte - JKS: detected from the 0xFEEDFEED magic number Both formats are supported for import.
 
Format of the imported keystore (the same value as detectedFormat).
 
Capability Grant embedded summary. capabilities mirrors the grant's JSONB capabilities array.
 
The limits of the Constraint Policy version a grant enforces.
 
The use that exhausted a Capability Grant, as the cryptographic service's consumption ledger recorded it.
REVOKED_ON_USE: the single permitted use was taken.
 
 
The capability grant a conferral would create.
 
 
 
One live sign-in session of a person.
 
The kind of the identity provider that authenticated the person.
 
A list of live sign-in sessions
 
Metadata about a successfully imported trusted certificate (CA).
 
Metadata about a successfully imported private key.
 
Lifecycle state, as the lower-case wire alias of the key-status vocabulary: active, pending_rotation, rotated, expired, revoked, archived, suspended, pending_destruction, deleted_logical.
 
Quick summary of a keystore import's results.
 
The filter and page of an internal cryptographic use case listing (internalCryptoUseCases().list).
The tenant's internal cryptographic use cases: a runtime identity (an actor and its credential), the grants and constraints it uses, provisioned and governed as one unit.
A provisioned internal cryptographic use case and the client secret of the actor credential it created.
InternalCryptoUseCase aggregate projection.
 
Lifecycle state
 
Why the use case was revoked.
 
 
OAuth 2.0 token introspection response (RFC 7662)
 
 
 
Gson TypeAdapter for Byte Array type
Gson TypeAdapter for Byte Array type
Gson TypeAdapter for java.util.Date type If the dateFormat is null, ISO8601Utils will be used.
Gson TypeAdapter for java.util.Date type If the dateFormat is null, ISO8601Utils will be used.
Gson TypeAdapter for JSR310 LocalDate type
Gson TypeAdapter for JSR310 LocalDate type
Gson TypeAdapter for JSR310 OffsetDateTime type
Gson TypeAdapter for JSR310 OffsetDateTime type
Gson TypeAdapter for java.sql.Date type If the dateFormat is null, a simple "yyyy-MM-dd" format will be used (more efficient than SimpleDateFormat).
Gson TypeAdapter for java.sql.Date type If the dateFormat is null, a simple "yyyy-MM-dd" format will be used (more efficient than SimpleDateFormat).
How many authorizations reference this key, by kind.
 
Component for composite key import (public key only).
 
Algorithm family (optional, can be inferred).
 
Component of a composite hybrid key (public information only).
 
A scheduled, executed, cancelled or failed destruction of a key or of one of its material versions: what the approval of a destruction request scheduled and how it ended.
REQUEST when the request named the period; TENANT_POLICY or DEPLOYMENT_POLICY when it came from that lifecycle policy's default; DEFAULT for the platform's 30 days.
 
 
KEY destroys every material the key had left and retires its Key ID for good; MATERIAL destroys one material version of a key that keeps another.
 
SCHEDULED waits for its cooling-off period to end; EXECUTED destroyed the versions; CANCELLED was ended by a cancel, which restored the versions; FAILED destroyed nothing, because the versions were no longer the approved ones or could not be erased, and is never retried.
 
Complete key metadata and PUBLIC key material.
How a composite key's components are combined — the construction axis that a coarse key type deliberately does not carry.
 
 
How the key was created: GENERATED or IMPORTED.
 
Key structure: SIMPLE or COMPOSITE.
 
Import request for a simple or composite (hybrid) PUBLIC cryptographic key.
 
Key derivation function of an imported COMPOSITE_KEM_COMBINE key.
 
Key structure: SIMPLE (default) or COMPOSITE.
 
What one lifecycle act, taken under one cause, does to each read operation, and whether the act is admissible from the key's current status at all.
The lifecycle act.
 
 
Why a key left its operative state.
 
Per-key server verdict: for each lifecycle act and each cause, which read operations stop, continue, or stop on some material versions only.
The key's projected status today.
 
 
Whether one read operation stops, continues, or stops on some material versions only, once the act is taken.
 
The read leg.
 
STOPS: refused on every evaluated material version (or there is none).
 
The filters and page of a key listing (keys().list).
Uniform exception thrown by the public AnkaSecure Key Management SDK surface.
The keys of the workload's tenant: listing and reading, creation and import, export of the public part, the metadata update, and the key lifecycle (suspend, reactivate, revoke, archive).
A key's automatic-rotation schedule and one page of its executions, latest due first.
 
 
Full replacement of the key's rotation schedule: its enablement, its optional cadence override and its usage options.
 
Where the key stands with respect to automatic rotation.
 
The key's effective automatic-rotation schedule: its enablement, the cadence it follows and where that comes from, its usage options, the ceilings applied, and the next instant the key is due.
 
Read-only, per-alias analysis of a PKCS#12 / JKS keystore.
 
The key derivations an import of the keystore would run, against the import budget.
 
Comprehensive response for a keystore import (PKCS#12 / JKS).
 
Summary metadata for a cryptographic key after a lifecycle operation (typically rotation: same kid, advanced material version).
How a composite key's components are combined — the construction axis that a coarse key type deliberately does not carry.
 
 
Current lifecycle state, relayed verbatim from the cryptographic service; the declared set is its vocabulary.
 
Request to destroy an archived key once its destruction request is approved and its cooling-off period has elapsed.
 
Request to destroy one material version once its destruction request is approved and its cooling-off period has elapsed.
 
The material versions of a key: every version the key has had, with its status, and the revocation of one version.
MaterialRevokeRequest
 
MaterialVersionResponse
 
What a destruction request for this version requests: MATERIAL destroys this version alone; KEY, when the key has no other version outside a destruction, destroys the whole key and retires its Key ID, and needs admin.keys.mark-for-destruction and an ARCHIVED key.
 
Per-material lifecycle status.
 
OAuth 2.0 error response per RFC 6749 Section 5.2 with additional RFC 7807 fields
 
OAuth 2.0 error code per RFC 6749 Section 5.2.
 
What a conferral would add to the actor. required and confersNew always answer; alreadyHeld and toAdd name scopes and are null unless the caller holds admin.tenant.actor.roles.read — namesVisible says which of the two shapes this is, so a withheld list is never confused with an empty one.
 
Request for key creation.
 
Key derivation function combining the component secrets of a COMPOSITE_KEM_COMBINE key.
 
Cryptographic purpose.
 
Response from key creation.
 
PageableObject
 
PageActorResponse
 
PageAdminKeyResponse
 
PageApplicationResponse
 
PageCapabilityGrantResponse
 
PageConstraintPolicyResponse
 
PageExchangeContextResponse
 
PageExchangeListItemResponse
 
PageInternalCryptoUseCaseResponse
 
 
 
The keys a PKCS#7 → JOSE conversion use case binds.
 
ProblemDetail
 
Standard RFC 7807 problem envelope.
Standard RFC 7807 problem envelope.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why a key can no longer encrypt or sign.
 
WebAuthn AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialDescriptorJSON
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialParameters
 
The client extensions requested
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON
The attestation conveyance preference
 
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialUserEntityJSON
 
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON
 
The user verification requirement
 
The operation was not performed: the tenant's quorum policy gates it, so the Admin API recorded a quorum request instead and answered 202 Accepted.
One approver's decision on a quorum request.
 
APPROVE counts toward the quorum; one REJECT ends the request.
 
What a destruction request asks to destroy, and the cooling-off period its approval schedules.
REQUEST, TENANT_POLICY, DEPLOYMENT_POLICY or DEFAULT.
 
 
KEY destroys every version the key has left and retires its Key ID; MATERIAL destroys one version.
 
The filters and page of the workload's own quorum request listing (quorumRequests().list).
The workload's own quorum requests: the destruction requests and gated key changes it made.
One page of quorum requests, newest first.
 
The quorum request the Admin API opened instead of performing a gated operation (202 Accepted): what is now waiting for people to approve it.
A gated operation waiting for, or decided by, its quorum of approvers.
 
The gated operation.
 
TENANT for a tenant's request; DEPLOYMENT for a platform request.
 
IDENTITY when a person requested; WORKLOAD when an administrative workload identity did; APPLICATION when an application did, with its own token or an actor's.
 
PENDING while it waits; EXECUTED once its quorum was reached and the operation ran; SCHEDULED when its quorum was reached and it takes effect at takesEffectAt (a platform recovery, which the tenant may cancel until then); FAILED when the operation refused to run at that moment (failureType says why); REJECTED by an approver; CANCELLED by its requester, by the tenant, or because its requester can no longer act; EXPIRED when it waited past expiresAt.
 
Request to reset password using token
 
Response for successful password reset
 
Resume a SUSPENDED Cryptographic Exchange.
 
Revoke a Cryptographic Exchange (irreversible).
 
Revocation metadata for the audit trail and compliance reporting
 
Server-authoritative rotation admissibility preview for a source key.
 
Why a key's material was rotated.
 
The page of a key's rotation execution history (rotation().listExecutions).
What a rotation-schedule write on this deployment admits beyond the interval grammar.
 
New material spec for a Stable KID rotation (no kid).
 
Key derivation function combining the component secrets of the successor COMPOSITE_KEM_COMBINE material.
 
The rotation of a key: an immediate rotation, whether a rotation is admissible now, the key's automatic-rotation schedule and the history of its scheduled executions.
Parameters for a Stable KID rotation.
 
Maximum cryptoperiod the compliance packs state for the key's class (NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 §5.3.6), which bounds the key's rotation interval.
 
Which bound brought the next rotation forward.
 
Semantic version of each policy the key's schedule is composed from.
 
Which policy the triggers come from.
 
Rotation trigger, discriminated by `type`.
One page of a schedule's executions, latest due first.
 
One execution of a schedule: when it was due, the attempts it took and how it ended.
 
One durable schedule of a tenant: the obligation it carries, the resource it acts on and its status.
 
Owning wrapper for a sensitive byte[].
Owning wrapper for a sensitive char[] (typically a client secret, password, or other character-secret material returned by System.console().readPassword() or by APIs that operate on char[]).
Representing a Server configuration.
Representing a Server configuration.
Representing a Server Variable for server URL template substitution.
Representing a Server Variable for server URL template substitution.
A log-safe summary of the bound session, derived by parsing the JWT claims locally (via Nimbus) — no dedicated server endpoint is involved.
An entry skipped because it already exists (an idempotent re-import).
 
SortObject
 
 
 
Algorithm profile supported by the platform, including cryptographic capabilities, security classification, and lifecycle status.
Algorithm category: CLASSICAL for traditional cryptography, POST_QUANTUM for quantum-resistant algorithms, HYBRID for composite algorithms combining both.
 
Composite construction mode.
 
 
Lifecycle status: RECOMMENDED for active use, EXPERIMENTAL for testing, LEGACY for deprecated algorithms
 
The filters of the tenant's supported algorithm catalogue (keys().supportedAlgorithms).
Suspend an ACTIVE Exchange Context.
 
Suspend an ACTIVE Cryptographic Exchange.
 
Suspend an ACTIVE internal crypto use case.
 
Request to temporarily suspend a key for incident investigation
 
 
A tenant-scoped operation group was reached from a session bound to no tenant: the session of a platform (ROOT) workload.
One membership the authenticated identity may sign into
PLATFORM_ADMIN for the membership of the platform tenant, TENANT_ADMIN for any other tenant
 
 
 
 
 
Renders a server-supplied string so it can enter an exception message, a log line or terminal output without changing what the operator's terminal shows or does.
The key is due for rotation when the interval has elapsed since the activation of its primary material.
 
 
OAuth 2.0 token response (RFC 6749 §5.1) for every grant.
 
Token type (RFC 6749 §7.1): 'Bearer' on every grant, except 'DPoP' (RFC 9449 §5) for an administrative workload's client_credentials grant sent with a DPoP proof, whose token is bound to the proof key
 
PATCH-style update.
 
Gets or Sets sensitivity
 
Result of validating an Exchange's references and cross-entity invariants
 
ValidationViolation
 
ValidationWarning
 
Optional validity window, enforced by the cryptographic service on every request as [validFrom, validUntil).
 
How an administrative workload proves its identity to the platform's token endpoint.
Centralized zeroization helpers for the ANKASecure Key Management SDK secure-memory layer.